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Voluntary Assumption of Risk and
the Gratuitous Passenger

G. J. Skene*

In the so-called gratuitous passenger cases, the defence of voluntary
assumption of risk, being a complete defence to negligence, has
fallen into some disfavour with the courts in recent years, preference
having been given to the more moderate defence of contributory
negligence with its consequent apportionment of responsibility.'
With one exception, 2 this has also proved to be the case in their
dealing with a gratuitous passenger's rights against the drunken
driver found to be grossly negligent under the motor vehicle legislation.a
As a rule, the plea of volenti and that of contributory negligence
go together, so that the defence of contributory negligence may
succeed where volenti fails. The defences can cover the same field, so
to speak. The essence of volenti is that the plaintiff has abrogated his
legal rights. The Principle was summarized by Ritchie J. of the
4
Supreme Court of Canada in 1969 in Eid v. Dumas:
...the rule embodied in the maxim volenti nonfit injuria was

discussed by the present Chief Justice speaking on behalf of the
majority of this Court in Lehnert v. Stein, 5 where he said in
case of Car& Gen'lIns. Corp. Ltd. v. Seymour
reference to the
6

& Maloney:
That decision establishes that where a driver of a motor vehicle
invokes the maxim volenti non fit injuria as a defence to an
action for damages for injuries caused by his negligence to a
passenger, the burden lies upon the defendant of proving that the
plaintiff, expressly or by necessary implication, agreed to exempt the defendant from liability for any damage suffered by the
plaintiff occasioned by that negligence, and that, as stated in
Salmond on Torts, 13th ed., p. 44:
*G. J. Skene, Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie University. This note is based
on a paper given by the author at a conference on Recent Developments in Torts and
Automobile Insurance at Dalhousie Law School on 16th March, 1974.
1. E.g., Eid v. Dumas, [1969] S.C.R. 668;McDonaldv. Dalgleish, [19730 2 O.R.
826.
2. I.e., where there is a "joint venture in drunknness", infra.
3. Motor Vehicle Act R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191 s. 223.
4. [1969] S.C.R. 668.
5. [1963] S.C.R. 38.
6. [19561 S.C.R. 322.
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"The true question in every case is: did the plaintiffgive a real
consent to the assumption of the risk without compensation:did
the consent
really absolve the defendant from the duty to take
7
care?"

And of course, absolution from legal liability is predicated upon
knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the nature and extent of the
risks involved. Given that knowledge, acceptance of the legal risk of
injury can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. 8 On the
other hand, liability for contributory negligence can be imposed upon
the plaintiff where he did not know but should have known of the
danger which confronted him. Further, the plaintiff may have appreciated the danger ut have been recklessly indifferent to it and so
negligent as regards his own safety. Thus it is relatively easy for the
courts to move from one defence to the other.
As a matter of social policy, the defence of contributory negligence is preferable to that of volenti. It permits a more equitable
distribution of loss in a situation where the defendant driver has
proved to be the primary instrument in causing the plaintiff's injury.
Moreover, it may (very) occasionly act as some deterrent to the
irresponsible or drunken driver. In the words of Professor Fleming:
...contributory negligence by merely reducing, instead of
extinguishing, recovery serves as a deterrent for both parties,
the driver as well as the passenger. By not letting the former
escape scot free, the law of torts as thus doing its share to combat
drunk-driving by promoting his insurance company to discipline him in exercising its contractual or statutory right of indemnity and increasing his future premiums. Nor is it in any way
unjust to permit the passenger some recovery, for his fault is
usually much the lesser. .... 9

Be that as it may, it is a sad commentary upon human nature that so
many of these cases come before the courts with monotonous regularity.
It was observed earlier that, with one exception, the drunken
driver will find small comfort in pleading the defence of volenti.
Stevens v. Hoeberg10 is a typical decision. The plaintiff was injured
when a car driven by the defendant and in which she was a passenger
left the road at high speed and rolled over. The driver was intoxicated
7. Emphasis added.
8. E.g., Deauville v. Reid (1967), 52 M.P.R. 218, 223-4.
9. The Law of Torts, (4th ed., Law Book Co., 1971) 244.
10. (1973), 29 D.L.R. (3rd) 673. See also, Car & General Ins. Corp. Ltd. v.
Seymour & Maloney, [1956] S.C.R. 322;Lehnertv. Stein, [1963] S.C.R. 38;Roy v.
McEwan (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 43;Hallidayv. Essex, [1971) 3 O.R. 621; Lewis v.
Sayers (1971), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 543.
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and had been engaged in heavy drinking with other passengers in the
car. The plaintiff had probably had at least some drinks. The original
purpose of the journey had been to buy a wedding ring for the plaintiff
at a town some distance from where the driver and his passengers
were living. The ring was purchased, along with a considerable
amount of beer, and the accident took place on the return journey. It
was clear that when the original journey began there was no intention
on the part of the defendant or his passengers to purchase beer. It was
also found that the plaintiff did not participate in the arrangements to
buy the beer. Lerner J. held that the defence of voluntary assumption
of risk failed. The mere joining in the consumption of some beer by
the plaintiff was not sufficient to make her volens. She was, however,
assessed with 25% contributory negligence as she had the opportunity to leave the car on a number of occasions, the conduct of the other
occupants having made it apparent to her that the journey was fraught
with danger.
The position is, however, different where there is a "joint
venture in drunkenness". The leading case is the Supreme Court of
Canada decision of Miller v. Decker.11 A number of young men of
which the plaintiff was one formed a common purpose "to get feeling
good and then go to the dance hall". They achieved their ambition,
arrived at the dance hall but later predictably crashed their car. It was
held that the defendant driver had been grossly negligent, but the
plaintiff failed to recover, on the ground of volenti. The defendant
when at the beer parlour must have required the plaintiff to have
assumed all the risks that the exciting evening of imbibing might
entail and the plaintiff must have been taken to have accepted that
requirement. The difficulty, of course, is in establishing the relevant
time at which this common purpose is formed, but Rand J. of the
Supreme Court in Miller v. Decker 12 had no trouble in fixing it at the
beginning of the evening, the time when the drinking plans were
made.
The case has since been followed many times. l3 A recent case is
Priestly v. Gilbert.14 The defendant, whilst driving on the wrong side
11. [1957] S.C.R. 624.
12. Ibid.
13. Tobin v. Fennell (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 513; Deauville v. Reid (1967), 52
M.P.R. 218; Boulay v. Wild (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 249; Tallow v. Tailfeathers,
[1973] 6.W.W.R. 732. See also, CONRAD v. Crawford (1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d)
386; Tomlinson v. Harrison (1972), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 26; Allen v. Lucas (1972), 25
D.L.R. (3d) 218.

14. [1974] 1 O.R. (2d) 365.
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of the road, collided with an oncoming car. The occupants of the
other car were both killed and the plaintiff, a passenger in the
defendant's car, was severely injured. Both the defendant and the
plaintiff were drunk at the time, and had been drinking together
throughout the day. The trial judge found that the plaintiff and the
defendant had embarked upon a joint venture which the plaintiff
knew or should have known would be dangerous, and that he voluntarily accepted the risk of personal injury. The action was dismissed.
The plaintiff appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal, where the
defence of volenti was sustained. In dismissing the appeal, reference
was made with approval to the reason for judgment given by Rand J.
in Miller v. Decker. 15 Rand J. had said in part:
As between themselves there is no doubt of what would have
been required by Decker in the inter-change that is to be constructed between these young men as they sat down at the beer
table to begin "to make an evening of it". That he would have
required the other two to assume the risks all were able to
foresee and would have participated in creating, to take the same
risks that he was taking, is inevitable development, and the
obvious hazards were theirs equally and jointly; and one can
imagine the reasonable response of Decker, had his mind still
been clear enough, if either of them had let fall a suggestion that
he would be responsible for their safety: they would have been
told to get into another car.
It is equally clear that Miller is to be taken to have accepted
that requirement. This would have been obvious if he had
remained sober and in command of his faculties; and having, by
his voluntary acts, co-operated in creating and placing himself
in the midst of the mounting dangers, his intoxication does not
quality his acceptance.
Similar conclusions were reached in two other recent "jointdrinking" cases, Tomlinson v. Harrison,1 6 and Tallow v. Tailfeathers. 17 Both cases have the additional feature that they involved
stolen cars and in the former the police were actually giving chase
when the accident occurred. The plaintiff had acquiesced in the
escape attempt. Volenti operated as a complete defence in both. In the
former case the plaintiff's claim was also defeated by the public
policy defence of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, i.e., the plaintiff,
being a party to the criminal offence, could not treat his co-offender's
conduct in the performance of theii joint criminal ventures as a tort
against himself.' 8
15. [1957] S.C.R. 624, 630.
16. (1972), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 26.
17. [1973] 6 W.W.R. 732.
18. C.f. the judgment of Clement J. A. in Tallow v. Tailfeathers, supra.
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But in Halliday v. Essex, 19 the Ontario High Court refused to
regard a "joint venture in drinking" as giving rise to the defence of
volenti. The case concerned a "drinking weekend" at a summer
cottage. Late in the evening, after all the participants had become
drunk, they went for a drive. The car left the road and struck a tree,
injuring the plaintiff. The learned trial judge found that the plaintiff,
although a willing participant in the weekend junketing, had not
voluntarily assumed the legal risk of injury. He had, however, failed
to take reasonable care of himself and had contributed by this want of
care to his own injury. His blame was assessed at 40%. It is submitted, with respect, that this decision is out of the mainstream of
authority in such cases. It would seem quite clear that the defendant
and his cronies, including the plaintiff, had formed their common
purpose in drinking at the outset of the weekend (indeed, before) with
all that that would entail. The facts would therefore seem to fall
squarely within the Miller v. Decker principle. Miller v. Decker,
however, was not considered.
Finally, reference should be made to two cases where a joint
venture in drunkenness was not involved. Both these cases came
before the Ontario High Court in 1973. They both concerned dragracing. In both the plaintiff was an injured passenger who sued the
defendant driver. In the first case, McDonald v. Dalgleish,20 it was
held that volenti could not succeed; there was, however, contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. But in the second of the two
cases, Deskau et al. v. Dziama, 2 1 it was held that the plaintiff was
volens and the action was dismissed. The cases (differ) on the facts in
one important respect: the former case involved a more or less
spontaneous drag-race between two cars on the highway. Dragracing was not the original purpose of the journey. In Deskau et al. v.
Dziama, 22 on the other hand, the object of the drive was to take the
defendant's car at high speed over a number of sharp hills with a view
to achieving the maximum thrill by launching the car into the air at
each crest. It was, accordingly, a joint venture in drag-racing and
akin to a common enterprise in drinking. 23 Keith J. said in part:
19. [1971] 3 0.R. 621.
10. [1973] 2 0.R. 826.
21. (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 36.
22. Ibid.
23. C.f. Schwindt v. Giesbrecht(1958), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 770, where the plaintiff, a
gratuitous passenger, in urging his driver to outrace a police car had agreed to
contribute to the fine if they were caught.
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Counsel for the plaintiffs submits that while Miss Deskau and
Arthur Brooks undoubtedly freely and voluntarily joined in a
venture that was fraught with danger, it was only on the basis
that the brakes on the defendant's car were in good working
order and that they never accepted the additional risk involved in
riding in a car whose brakes failed.
In my view, and having regard only to the whole foolhardy
frolic that these young people were jointly engaged in 24 . . .

The nature of the risk that these plaintiffs voluntarily assumed
was unlimited in the circumstances. Any one25of many things
could and was likely to bring about disaster.
To conclude: voluntary assumption of risk as a defence in gratuitous
passenger cases has met with little success in recent years, apart from
those cases where a drinking enterprise common to both parties has
been established by the defendant so that it can be said that the
plaintiff must have consented to the legal risk of injury. The notion of
a common enterprise in drinking can be extended by analogy to other
situations where a common purpose has been agreed upon in advance
by the active encouragement of the plaintiff, or where there has been
passive compliance on his part without domination by the defendant. 2 6 Whether such a development is desirable is another matter.
24. Emphasis added.
25. (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 36, 40.
26. See also Car and General Ins. Corp. Ltd. v. Seymour and Maloney, [1956]
S.C.R. 322.

